

## A CUBAN BOMBSHELL.

## Important Debate on the War in the Spanish Cortes.

## A PERSISTENT AGITATOR.

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## SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INTERPELATION.

Barcelona, August 6, 1877.

The Cuban insurrection has now lasted nine years. Nine years of civil war, and war attended with such barbarism, never has the world known before. Yet this is the case with the "insurrection" begun at Yara in 1868. The whole resources of the proud and haughty mother country, in men and money, the valor of her soldiers and the skill of her generals, have not yet sufficed to subvert it. When the bill of costs in factored up it will astonish the world. From official documents I learn that the number of soldiers sent out from Spain to Cuba between October, 1868, and 1st of June, 1876, was 179,875; sent out 1876-7, 25,000; total, 204,875—exclusive of generals, chiefs and officers. In two months 15,000 more will embark. The cost for their passage has already been made with Messrs. A. Lopez & Co., the steamship owners of Barcelona and Cadix.

**THE EXPENSE OF SENDING TROOPS.**

The average cost of a soldier's passage has been \$30. These 204,875 men will have cost \$6,146,250 in passage alone. Besides this there is the cost of those who have come home when their time has expired and the cost to and from the generals, chiefs and officers and of employes. As to what has been spent in food, clothing and war munitions I have no statistics, and so will not venture to guess, nor at the amount of pay to the army from the highest to the lowest rank. It must, however, have been fabulous. Apart from the treasure poured out the blood reckoning is also appalling. I have before me the official list of *bajas* or casualties from 1868 to June 1, 1876—

	Of Infantry.	Of Cavalry.	Of Artillery.	Of Engineers.	Of Medical Staff.	Of Chaplains.	Of Clergy.	Of Religious.	Of Nuns.	Of Priests.	Of Bishops.	Of Cardinals.	Of Nobles.	Of Gentry.	Of Peasants.	Of Laborers.	Of Artisans.	Of Merchants.	Of Clergymen.	Of Lawyers.	Of Doctors.	Of Teachers.	Of Students.	Of Clerks.	Of Servants.	Of Domestic.	Of Foreign.	Of Native.	Of Total.
Killed in battle.	10	163	5,728	14	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Killed in the field.	12	92	2,189	12	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Wounded.	10	170	3,377	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Of total.	32	325	9,105	24	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
Aggregate.	54	587	15,212	44	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40

No official list is obtainable later than June 1, 1876.

**THE WAR A SUICIDE.**

That there is something wrong is self-evident and is confirmed by the absolute ignorance in which the Spaniards in the Peninsula are kept as to the true state of affairs. Every one of the dozens of governments Spain has had since 1868 has fed discussion, in the Cortes and the press, of the Cuban war. All alike have been cries of "peace, peace, when there is no peace." Hundreds of times have I myself heard Prim, Serrano, Topete, Sagasta, Zorrilla, Castelar and the other men of the home revolution declare in the Cortes that the insurrection was "about to end," was "ended," &c.; oftentimes reading telegrams from Dulce, Caballero de Rodas, Balmaceda, Orsaga, Jovellar and others of the "generals" who, in rapid succession, have held supreme command in the island to that effect. The public, however, could not reconcile all these boastful assertions with the *desastrosos* demands for more troops and more money, which ever accompanied them, always under the pretext of covering natural *bajas* and administering the "insubstantial stroke." But a mistaken sense of national pride prevented much being spoken or written on the subject. From 1868 onward, he who ventured even to hint that Spain might be weary in the struggle, or that she was not doing all she could to confirm her supremacy, or that the war was far from its termination, or that it was prolonged through the blunders of her generals and the capriciousness of her army contractors, or of the clique in Madrid and Havana who fatten on its continuance, was instantly denounced as a filibuster. The mere application of the word sufficed to terrify everybody, and so everybody tried to prove his "patriotism" by holding his tongue on the disagreeable question. Governments, Cortes and people alike buried their heads in the sand and became veritable ostriches in the great dangers existing beyond the Atlantic.

**A BOLD PATRIOT.**

But a man has at last appeared bold enough to speak the truth and to lift up the curtain. He has been obliged to do it under his personal immunity as a Deputy to the Cortes; otherwise his life would not have been worth a dollar's purchase. No newspaper would have given space for his charges, but all (that is to say all now permitted to circulate) have denounced him as "unpatriotic." So much is it true that even the chief organ of the opposition at present, the *Imparcial*, has joined in the hue and cry against the bold Deputy's persistence in bringing Cuba on the carpet at this juncture. It considers it highly indecent and unpatriotic. The rest of the Madrid press agree in censuring him for his "attitude" and in praising the government for the way in which they eventually stopped his mouth. The Deputy referred to is none other than a Spanish general, Don Manuel Salamanca y Negret.

**GENERAL SALAMANCA'S ANTECEDENTS.**

Before I go further let me give you his antecedents. General Salamanca is no relation of the famous Spaniard, the venerable Marquis de Salamanca, who introduced the railway system into Spain and who conferred other benefits on his country. He is the son of Lieutenant General Louis Salamanca, Conde de Campo Alegre and Marques de Villa Campo. Born in Burgos in 1832, he was early destined to the military profession. After passing his preliminary examinations with great success he entered the army as ensign in 1847. He took part in the campaign against the Carlists in Catalonia in 1848-9. When the Spanish government sent a contingent to Italy under General Cordova, at the time the Pope's temporal sovereignty was menaced, he accompanied it and served in it till July, 1851. Soon after his return he imbibed the then growing hatred to the Bourbon rule as personified in Queen Isabella, and took part in the unsuccessful military pronouncements of 1866 and 1868, and the successful one of 1869. Prim promoted him to that

year to lieutenant colonel, and gave him the command of the regiment of Harbours. For his services against the republican insurrection of Malaga, which lasted till 1869, he obtained the rank of colonel. An ardent sympathizer with Prim, he hailed with gladness the proclamation of King Amadeus. In 1872 he obtained the command of the regiment of Burgos. Soon after he was sent to the camp at Amalago, where he was killed by the Carlists. He was accompanied by the King on his journey to Catalonia. Next we find him occupying an honorable post in the prolonged and difficult attack on the Arsenal of Ferrol, which had rebelled in favor of the republic. In a royal order, issued after the taking of the town and arsenal, it was expressly stated that he had occupied the place of the greatest extremity and danger. For this he was promoted to general of brigade, and received the appointments of military governor of Malaga. He crushed the second republican insurrection in that city, and received honorable mention in the general orders. In 1875 he was appointed military governor and chief of the columns of operation of the Province of Tarragona, and by his energy and dash soon freed the district from Carlist sway. In one of his encounters he is said to have defeated 6,000 Carlists, his own force being but 622. His next exploits were at and near Bilbao in 1875. He commanded at the battle of Arbolancos and at the taking of Sarratua. He was made military governor of Bilbao and as such sustained the defence of that city against the Carlist besiegers to the very moment when relief came at the hands of Generals Concha and Serrano, after the storming of the heights of Somorrostro. Next he was transferred to the Army of the Centre, as general of division, under Pavía. He swept the Province of Valencia of the Carlist hosts, whom he finally defeated at Colado, which had fallen into their hands. He took their whole garrison and artillery. He also took Cheiza, which the Carlists had occupied. This place he fortified and held. After these services he was appointed to the command of the flag of the Ebro to the sea, which he held till the Carlists finally gave in. No ends, for the present, his military career. He has proved himself a brave and able commander. In his face there is every indication of intense tenacity and determination. Placed on half pay, he sought election to the Cortes and succeeded. He instantly placed himself on the opposition seats, and maintained a perpetual crusade against army and navy abuses at home and Cuban mismanagement abroad.

**A THORN IN THE FLESH.**

He has been a veritable thorn in the flesh to the existing government. He is no orator, but he is a vast collector of documents and evidence tending to bear out the arguments he uses. I have known him since he was colonel, and I have ever found him highly monarchical in his sentiments. He is an avowed enemy of republicanism as it has been practiced in Spain. He is an equally bitter enemy of the jobbery and trickery with which all the Spanish political parties are tainted. To Cuban affairs he has devoted great attention and come to the conclusion that the continuance of the war is not due to filibustering, cupidity of the United States or tenacity of the rebels, but to faults nearer at hand. In a word, he believes it could have been ended years ago if the rich men of Havana and Madrid, the Cuban volunteers, &c., had desired it. On the contrary, he believes all these have a strong interest in keeping it alive. Troops on leave and advances, profits on conveyance of troops, profits on their armaments, clothing and food, are, in his opinion, the main causes of the prolongation of the struggle, with nothing of the want of military skill and energy displayed by the various generals sent out. Subvention to leading journals of the Peninsula for the purpose of hiding the truth or procuring its suppression are obvious convictions of the gallant Salamanca.

**HIS PARLIAMENTARY CRUSADE.**

He opened his attacks last year, asking for documents, &c., on the Cuban war. To get rid of his importunities the government "promised to produce them," but, of course, reserving to themselves today and the hour. Needless to say, they have not been produced yet. Tired of this reluctance, General Salamanca, General Pavía (the author of the *coup d'etat* of 1873) and other Deputies signed and presented a proposition asking the government to lay on the table "all the documents in the Ministries of War and Ultramar relating to the Cuban war, and also to give at once explanations on the state of that war, and of the island generally." In supporting the motion General Salamanca, the most powerful of the day, spoke in the request of the President and other Deputies to suspend it while the budget was on the carpet. He had now received a request not to interrupt another important matter, and he had been told the days and hours of the present Legislature were numbered. He did not believe the Cortes was like a theatre, with its performance hours and minutes fixed. Its closing ought to depend on the matters it had to discuss. He considered the Cuban situation grave, both in the civil and the military point of view. All the governments and all the authorities had been deceived, and what was worse, they had been deceiving the country for eight years. In view of this, he thought the Cuban question ought to be fully discussed. He had come prepared with abundant documents, and he desired the government to prolong the sessions a day or two if necessary, so as to give his interpellation a place after the budget and urgent matters. He hoped they would take into account the gravity of the circumstances and how serious it would be to leave his motion in suspense. He did not even believe the travels of a high personage (King Alfonso) ought to stop the sessions of the Cortes. They continued while he was in the north, and in no European countries had the pleasure journeys of the monarchs ever interfered with the discussions of the Parliaments. He therefore begged the government to give him a chance to speak. He would be quite content to wait till the Parliamentary inquiry as to the debt, &c., was over if the government would promise to give him a day after that was closing the Legislature.

**THE GOVERNMENT REPLY.**

The Minister of the Colonies, Martin de Herrera, replied. He thanked General Salamanca for his patience. Yet he had his companions in the government believed there was much impropriety in the present state of Cuba and in discussing certain questions relating thereto. General Herrera went on to credit for a spirit of impartiality, yet it was impossible for him to discuss them without the passion and prejudice of an opponent Deputy. Thus the good name of Spain, her military chiefs and her authorities in the island might be injured. The government had given priority to their desire not to elude any debate. This was proved in the previous Legislature, in the free discussion of the Cuban issue. If it were not for the present circumstances, the state of the insurrection, and that they were about to send out fresh reinforcements to give the final *coup de grace* to the insurrection, he would at once accept debate. But when the nation had to make fresh sacrifices he believed it not the moment to discuss the causes of the insurrection, the plans of campaign nor any other of the Cuban questions General Salamanca had opened up. If, however, in the use of his right conceded by the law, General Salamanca wished to make his interpellation, he must do so, but the government would not be accomplices in the opportunity of the discussion. In due time they would answer, but not now. Nor could they guarantee the General could exercise his right at the vacation, which were fixed to begin in two days. They did not think the vacation should be subordinated to a matter which it was not patriotic to discuss. They believed his discussion would be pernicious. They would applaud the conduct of the General if he voluntarily postponed it till after the Parliamentary inquiry respecting the Hacienda was finished, and if there was time then he should have his say.

**SALAMANCA'S PERSISTENCE.**

General Salamanca declared that he would treat the matter passionately simply because he belonged to the opposition. Besides, as he would have to speak of the periods when his own political friends commanded in Cuba, they might be sore he would deal out equal justice to all. He believed it the interest of the government to have the discussion, otherwise they would remain in the dark as to the weight of its accusations. He was his rights to the extreme, but had no objection to the termination of the "information Parliamentary," after that it was only a few hours he asked. He saw no reason to close the sessions on Wednesday simply because an "exalted personage" intended to begin a pleasure journey on Thursday. (This was I saw at the King, who had fixed Thursday for his departure to the Asturias, Galicia, &c., on a two months' tour by land and sea.) On other occasions the Cortes had sat during the absence of the King, as when he was in the North, and in no country whatever did the journeys of the king embarrass the discussions of the Parliament.

**A GENERAL DENIAL.**

The Minister of Ultramar repeated that the govern-

ment had no desire to fly from the discussion. They denied absolutely the assertion that the state of the war and finances in Cuba was worse than it was before General Martinez Campos went there, or that the present campaign had been fruitless, or that the next one would be fruitless too. The results of the present campaign had been considerable and efficacious. There had been the complete and positive pacification of Las Villas, an improvement of things in the Central Department, pursuit and prosecution of the insurgents in the Eastern Department, so much so that the government had had necessity, and he might say, were doing it now, to consider propositions for peace the rebels had made, in view of their impotence and of the results of the campaign. The results might have been more, not from fault of the General, but for the insuperable difficulties of nature and the rains, which this year had been heavier than ever. In view, however, of the great results actually achieved, which redounded to the glory of the army and its illustrious general, the government, so far from being discouraged, treat with high contempt certain insinuations. They consider the insurrection not as a power fighting against them, but as a rebellion and criminality, which ought to be and must be subdued. They were confident the rebels would be driven out of their corners and the war, terminated in the next campaign. They thought they counted on the co-operation of all good Spaniards. They had men and money in superabundance, and they were now preparing to send them out.

**GETTING INTO DEBATE.**

They thanked the Cortes for facilitating the means to send out so many resources of both kinds last October, and the efforts so far from being sterile had been crowned with results which had penetrated into the consciences of all the world except into that of General Salamanca.

**GENERAL SALAMANCA—Certainly not in mine!**

General Salamanca—Yes, and all the army of Cuba! The Minister proceeded to say he hoped his remarks would serve as a corrective to the words of General Salamanca. He had stated them for the satisfaction of the Congress and the country so as to place things in their proper light and the truth in front, and in order to avoid the fomenting of evil passions or fostering of evil interests or the encouraging of a cause hopelessly lost.

**GENERAL SALAMANCA—Mr. President, I am about to support my proposition, if you will permit me.**

**THE PRESIDENT—You are in your right, but I must first concede the turn to the Minister of War.**

**MINISTER OF WAR (General Ceballos)—I rise to protest against the assertion of General Salamanca that nothing has been done in this campaign. I myself may be taken as a competent witness, for the future and fortune of my children, as in Las Villas, consequently I receive constant private advice, and I have much more than the official one. I declare the pacification of Las Villas is complete, so much so that four soldiers and a corporal can go about anywhere and the *cayra* or sugar harvest has been made with complete tranquillity. The General-in-Chief does not push on with the activity all the world admires. Not only are the effects of his directions felt in Las Villas, but also in the other departments. The government has resources more than enough to conclude the war. Spain never recedes in questions of honor, and the honor of Spain is to preserve that precious jewel in the crown of Castile. She will, if necessary, send out her last man and consume her last cartridge. (Applause.)**

How often have I heard this stereotyped bragadocio uttered in this Cortes! I have heard it from Prim, from Serrano, from Topete, from Sagasta, from Zorrilla, from Castelar, and now it is repeated by General Ceballos—the last man and the last cartridge.

The President then intimated to General Salamanca that he might support his proposition.

**GREAT SPEECH OF GENERAL SALAMANCA.**

Señores, I had intended to retire my proposition, but after the words of the Ministers of Ultramar and of War, and seeing the approbation the Chamber has manifested, I will not shrink the combat, although I enter into it under great disadvantage. I accept it, therefore. I have not the eloquence of the Minister of Ultramar, nor, like him, the means of raising your enthusiasm. It can always be raised when good things (*cosas buenas*) are said, but I can only do so by present and direct facts, and those who present them are never heard with pleasure. As to what the Minister of War has said of the pacification of Las Villas, I permit me to read what General Riquelme said of the same thing in his time, and also General Montero Gabarte in his time, taken from their reports, and it will prove that the results of the present campaign have been less much less, than the results of former ones. I repeat, the results you so much admire and praise are far less than previous ones. I have no desire to attack General Martinez Campos or General Jovellar, but I say they have progressed nothing. This is just the epoch when all the campaigns general have announced the complete pacification of Las Villas. I boldly deny that the pacification is complete. General Ceballos, who told us of his plantations and his sugar harvest, knows very well that his father-in-law has just had one of his barns in Las Villas, and he ought also to know that in Santi Spiritu the rebels have just captured civil guards. He ought also to know that the Government of Zamora has just captured forty soldiers and other officers, some of whom for the pacification of Las Villas. In proof of my impartiality I assert that General Martinez Campos has never announced their pacification.

**MINISTER OF WAR—But private letters from interested persons say so.**

**General Salamanca—Then they know more than the General-in-Chief, General Riquelme, who acted under General Jovellar, written in his report a year or two ago—**

General Portillo has received the honorable title of the pacification of Las Villas. The Comandante General has declared officially, under the approval of the Captain General, that the country is completely pacified. The civil authorities act as in normal times, and the reconquest of the territory is already complete. Property can freely circulate without any restriction, directions, and except one or another insignificant robbery, common in all times in these jurisdictions, not a single deed can be cited which is in violation of the most insignificant military character.

This was said by General Riquelme. Señores, the same thing was said by General Montero Gabarte, by General Feliu, by General Yáñez, by General Calero de Rodas. It was just as true as it is now. The fact is the pacification of Las Villas has always been obtained at the beginning of every year's campaign. Because the authorities have sent there all the troops they had. You might just as well say that in Madrid the war was no war during the Carlist war, and that everything was happy and prosperous all the while the enemy were approaching and entering into Guadalupe, into Alcala, into Madrid, &c. The fact is that certain proprietors in Las Villas can have their sugar gathered it creates here an excellent impression, although in the rest of the island the disasters become multiplied. For the sugar harvest the captains general have always taken care to send great forces to Las Villas, leaving the other departments almost deserted, with the sole object of being able to say, "Las Villas is pacified and the sugar gathered in." In the month of April I provoked a debate on Cuba, its war and finances. I indicated the causes of the standstill position of the one and the afflictive state of the other, and I urged efficacious remedies. I shall repeat the same now. I will not be susceptible nor attack the credit of any authority, nor reduce the prestige of any of those who were there, and those who are now the hope of the country, but I shall point out the evils, and shall do it with sentiments of the purest patriotism, although the Minister of Ultramar thinks the contrary. I aspire to have the whole question studied, once for all, under a lengthy and more meditated criticism than that of an authority, however competent and authorized he may be.

**LETTING IN LIGHT.**

I assure the Cuban war and finance shall be the object of well mediated plan for all who may have to exercise command there and not to have, as now, the continuation of the most contradictory and radical reforms, varying with the commands, without regarding the most rudimentary military, financial or political principles. These have only produced contradictions and controversies between the friends and the enemies of the authority, without any advantage for the war. All the authorities, one after the other, affirm their plans the best. All have planned, in finance, measures which have proportioned resources for the time being, but which have afterwards been pronounced ruinous. Each and all of the high authorities have defended themselves by saying that they were removed before their plans of operations could produce results. The governments alone are the only ones without defence, for during their successive

directions of public affairs they have kept up these changes in command, and of every one have as customary said, "highly satisfied," &c., &c., although the results have been in no way flattering to the administration, nor procured any advantages in the war. The command in Cuba during the last eight years has been like a ball passing from hand without any one being able to conclude the game. Carloads of memoranda (reports) and orders have reached the Ministry of War, and all of them have been of no use to the country. He who is the future comes to looking the history of the war from these memoranda and documents will assuredly decide, because he will see described as victorious and heroic by one judged as defeat by his successor; plans judged as salutary converted into ruinous ones, hopes dispelled, and necessities demonstrated by one judged as absurdities by his successor. They all commence with approbations at the beginning, and with disapprobations at the end, of hopes and securities on going out and of studied reticences (graces) after a quarrel of a peevish nature) when the star is eclipsed, and they try to prove their irresponsibility. All the commands terminate with the phrase that "Her Majesty or the government are highly satisfied," &c., and that "want of health" is the only reason for accepting the resignation which in some cases has been presented and in others expected to be presented, and therefore considered as granted.

**COUNTER DE ROSE.**

Every year we are told Las Villas are pacified, that the rebels are dissolved and dissipated, and that all will finish in the next campaign. This is repeated by the press, yet nevertheless the war continues. Other nations in less time of war in a colony would have sent out a parliamentary commission to look into the causes of the insurrection and of everything. Full information would be sent to Parliament, and the affairs crushed with far less resource than has been been mispending. The memoranda are lying asleep in the respective government archives. In due time they will prove the want of harmony and meditation in everything referring to the administration of Cuba, the ignoring completely the truth about the war and the state of the finances. When discussions have been raised in both houses they have specially become reduced to mere personal attacks. Nothing is more easy than for the Congress to get to know even the most minute details if it chose, for the members have a right to intervene in all the acts and archives of the administration of the State. Nothing is more adverse to the interests of Cuba and of the country, nothing, in short, more punishable than this ignorance, in those who believe in it and those who consent to it.

**THE IMPORTANCE OF CUBA.**

The importance of Cuba is great, not only in its industry and commerce and the immense capitals there invested, but for the surplus revenue it would (but for the war) contribute to the relief of our home Treasury. Important also is the consideration for the Peninsular elements there, who through their adhesion to our cause are to day in the greatest misery, having lost by the insurrection their possessions and by the war their fortunes, while a few keep their riches and their property clear of detriment. I don't know whether it is accidental or whether because they are in general understanding both the one and the other, but the other, important is the credit of our flag and our nationality; but it cannot be sustained by slanders and patriotic phrases, expressions of hopes, &c., but by mediation and study over the evils and making the responsibility effective on those who fail to do right. Much light ought to be shed on everything, and it is desirable that Congress and the entire nation should fix attention on the evils which little by little are consuming that potent life and that boundless fountain of riches—Cuba. Up to within two years ago one might make allowance for the home ignorance as to the war, for the nation was involved in two civil wars more important and more vital for her. It might have been prudent to avoid the evils of disasters in Cuba and the pressing state of the home treasury coming here and adding stress to the elements of perturbation and threatening the ruin of order, by presenting to their eyes a happy image very similar to the one here, which we judged almost irreparable. But peace in the Peninsula having arrived, as element of perturbation remaining, all claims submitting to and paying enormous contributions and discounts of salaries; the interests of the debt unpaid, through the continuing necessities of the Cuban war, it is time we should know what occurs beyond the seas.

**A CHALLENGE TO THE MINISTRY.**

The government, therefore, should lift up the curtain and show the naked truth as to everything occurring. They have the means in their immense archives. Let them bring out the documents, or at any rate those I ask for. In April they eluded my proposition and silenced me by promising to bring them, but they have intentionally not brought them. We are in the ninth year of the war, the clandestine maneuvers increase, yet the government desire silence and the concealment of what happens. They monopolize public opinion by passing all Cuban news through the filter of their own examination and censorship. They prefer public opinion to be deceived by the reading of impassioned memoranda and clandestine publications to letting the naked truth of the official occurrence: rouse the spirit of the nation, which, overthrowing every obstacle, would then direct itself to definitive triumph. You all remember what answer my April interpellation received. Nothing could be more pallid and reserved. You all remember the answers to the speeches of the Marquis de la Havana (Concha) in the Senate. They simply reduced the question to a personal ground, but there was no clearing up of the matters discussed, nor was anything explained about the war. If to government incline themselves in such complete reserve, if they are so desirous to perpetuate ignorance and to ignore the truth, let the contrary be done: explain the state of the war, the duty in use of his legislative, should tell all, absolutely all, he knows, about that on which the government keep silence. If they are constantly in Cuba, as in Spain, desirous of placing the interests of the enemies before the just response of those who serve the country, who shed their blood for her and are ruined for her; if for the first there are to be repeated removals of embargoes on property and repeated pardons, and for the second nothing but sufferings and taxes; if the preferences and attentions are only to be for certain rich persons and the companies they form it is time that all who pride themselves on being good Spaniards, and who desire the war really to come to an end and should speak out without any sort of consideration, and prove their assertions with complete and trustworthy data, and such are these I have got here (pointing to the immense pile of papers close beside him), and let us all together learn the truth.

**NOT A SLIGHT MATTER.**

The war in Cuba is not one of those phenomena which can be caused to disappear with facility. It has profound roots. It has had nearly nine years of duration. It cannot be submitted to bargains (*transacciones*) and compacts as easy as those effected in Catalonia and the North. Something more is needed there; something more enduring, more political, more military and organic than what is done in the campaigns in the Peninsula. Out in Cuba, in addition to all the evils of the Hacienda and the war, profound perturbation has been created in the Spanish party itself. Many persons, and perhaps some of the most useful, have been accused of being filibusters, while others, who, perhaps with more reason, merit this accusation, seek to assume to themselves the only and genuine representation of the Spanish party. The administration of the Peninsula (I don't know whether with or without reason), is judged mediocre and extravagant, the military administration is unanimously judged bad, for it has the troops badly clothed, badly paid and badly fed. There is a want of organization in the Sanitary Service, the most important for the comfort and morals of the soldier. These and other causes, which I will hereafter explain and prove by authentic data, are the reasons for the *maldecimien* which overpowers the forces of the government and the action of the authorities, and they need mature examination if we are in earnest in wishing the war to terminate promptly.

All these causes produce maraudings and discontent, and end in antagonisms between those who are critics and those who are criticized. Each attacks the other's morality. Charges of filibustering run freely. Measures more or less violent are adopted which diminish the open friends and augment the secret enemies, who are worse than those in the field. Hence has arisen the saying that the real filibusters are not in Cuba, but in Madrid, and even in the palaces of Cuba and Madrid. Have acquired all the antecedents and data—private, official and reserved—that I possibly could in Madrid, Barcelona and Cuba. Also, I have asked many from the United States, for I intend to treat the question of Cuba extensively, dispassionately

and in the full justice of one who, not having had any intervention in any acts of its administration, possesses resolution and energy sufficient to do so; for I have the lively desire that the war should end.

**FIVE IMPORTANT POINTS.**

There are five points in which we all ought to be unanimous and conform, although each of us may attribute them to a different cause. They are:

- First—Want of proper organization of the war.
- Second—The ruin and decadence of the treasury and the riches of the island.
- Third—That the policy of the war is variable and evanescent.
- Fourth—that the administration is not good.
- Fifth—that the superfluous expenditure which has down the treasury is considerable.

The administration is not good, and, in fact, I attribute, in great part, the responsibility of the war, and I consider it the only and real origin of its prolongation.

**WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD DO.**

The administration ought to be judged in its relations with the wealth of the country, in its organization, number of employees, costs, receipts and expenses, and, finally, as to how far its action has benefited the war. Under the first point of view the Spanish administration in Cuba might very well defend itself and assert that it has been good. From 1820 to 1854 the exports augmented from \$8,997,419 to \$32,688,731 (see *Verde*). The imports rose from \$19,367,504 to \$31,618,436. These data, taken from the excellent Memoria of Señor Paredon y Latorre, Superintendent General in Cuba, may be used to prove the effects of good administration, viewed only in relation to the richness of the country.

If we pass to examine the administration in its relations with the public Treasury it is not so brilliant. All both Spaniards and Creoles, believe it needs much improvement. I think it and the action of the authorities one of the causes of the war. The great frauds in the collection of the taxes, and especially in the customs (*aduanas*) produce less gain to the Treasury, but at the same time less gain to their authors, for there can be no fraud without collusion, which must be heavily paid for. Formerly Cuba always had a surplus, and that came to the Peninsula for the benefit of the home Treasury, but not for the island. As to purity, I will merely remind you of the proclamation recently issued by the present Captain General, declaring that the penalties fixed for unfaithfulness (*desfidelidad*) on all who commit frauds in the administration. It is evident that when the authorities see themselves obliged to fix for such delicts the extreme penalties and make the proceedings more rapid, experience must have proved the ordinary penalties insufficient to check the evil. Even the government have approved the order of the Captain General against their own servants.

**THE DIRECTION OF THE WAR.**

The General continued a long time on the subject of these frauds and the bad administration as it affected the public Treasury. He backed up his remarks by reading an extract from the "Memoria of Señor Concha Vilamiel," published in 1871 by order of the Minister of War. He then passed on to his second point—the direction of the war—since the firing at Yara, October 10, 1868. He said:—If I read, a thousand times sadder, are there I have now to sketch. If I were to detail fully the *trivial* (triviality, or want of seriousness) with which the most important points have been resolved, the facility with which the approbation of the government has been obtained, only to be followed by disapprobation—if I were to demonstrate how costly for the Treasury it has been to have costly plans adopted and then rejected, and that the attempted economy has produced reduction in the richness in money with augmentation of the rebellion and of sacrifice of blood; if I were to stop and show how all this has been foreseen and how little has been done to avoid it, three complete sessions would not suffice, but in the end you would be convinced of the pernicious effects of the silence to portendingly guarded over everything related to our Antillas. I have, therefore, only indicated these questions, and if they receive as little attention at your hands as my poor observations did in April you cannot complain, as time goes on, of the ruin of the country and her Antillas. On you alone will be the responsibility for having neglected the remedy, while I shall have the satisfaction of having fulfilled the sad duty of anticipating new evils, and of announcing them when there is time to surmount them.

**"REINFORCEMENTS" FOR CUBA.**

In the past Legislature I was accused of impatience. I was told that the powerful reinforcements carried out by General Martinez Campos would finish the war in the winter campaign. I was even called a filibuster, but I declared that, as I would every man who has his honor and his conscience clean. The period (July) has expired.

**MINISTER OF ULTRAMAR—It has not.**

**General Salamanca—It has.** Read the *Diario de las Sesiones*, and you will see that the Minister of War declared the affair would be ended in the winter campaign. The period has passed, has matured. We are now in the epoch when we must suspend operations, as the rains are on and the heat approaches—the period of our heaviest losses, in which we can do nothing, and we have obtained no definite result. What has been obtained is little more or less than what was obtained in the preceding campaign. You doubt me? I have here the copies of all the official telegrams since October, 1868, up to date. [How the General got them nobody knows, except that he is somewhat like the Herald, which will never allow itself to be beaten in the pursuit of documents.] If the Deputies have the courtesy to read them they will see the results now obtained are less than former ones. I have had no participation to any of them, consequently cannot be judged as partial.

**SOME TELL-TALE FIGURES.**

Señor CORDOBA—What about 1874?

General Salamanca—I will read, and thus please you—1,474-1875, 1,136 killed, 640 wounded, 250 prisoners, 4,908 released, and, according to the telegrams of General Martinez Campos, 1875-1876, 705 killed (lower combat), 299 wounded, 489 prisoners, 3,760 released. In the equal period of 1869-1870 there were 3,347 killed, 233 wounded, 847 prisoners, 19,910 released; that is to say, the trifles of over 1,000 *bajas* to the enemy more than now. As I said before, we have now to endure a new postponement and to give a new *plus* to the suspension of operations. I fear the enemy may avail themselves of this to cause us fresh damage.

From critiques on the military mismanagement and on the plans that had been tried (then followed). Next he praised the small army existing in Cuba at the outbreak of the rebellion. It had in the beginning broken the magnitude of the war movement. But then it had the most spontaneous decision of the Peninsula. There were also the organic mistakes of the insurrection, taking under its banner an imposing but useless multitude of persons of both sexes, not capable of service. But the then Captain General (Loranzo) soon assumed a superior authority which somewhat embarrassed the other commands, taking from them their liberty of action and subjecting them to a tutelage which injured and depreciated their moral force. The Captain General was of contrary ideas to the new state of things in the Peninsula (the Revolution), and he asked to be relieved. A successor was sent out. The war had been initiated with the imposing proportions of a war of race, the pueblos on *masse* soon marched to the rebel camps, believing the victory would be the work of a moment. The concentration of the army necessary in the first instance gave them abundant tranquillity and complete security; but, very quickly the attitude of the army, united to the Peninsular element, gave an energetic and quite extensive organ, of Key West, undoubtedly saved the island for the time striking terror into the enemy, then unprovided with the necessary means for a war so full of privations. The government of General Prim, as soon as it had news of the magnitude and importance of the insurrection, managed to raise the army to 40,000 men, in spite of being itself involved in a thousand complications and having a civil war at home in prospect. They counted in this on the powerful help of the Peninsular element, which pledged itself to equip and sustain ten battalions of volunteers at sixteen reales pay and entrance bounty. These were organized in the ports of the Peninsula in two months, and embarked at the end of 1869. With these battalions and the ordinary *re-embar*, over fifty thousand were placed in the field. The campaign commenced. In those of 1871-2-3 the insurrection was reduced to less proportions than it now has and consequently its importance, for it is now far more serious than so well trained and handled as they now are.

Señor Cordoba interrupted, but in the tumult his words were lost.

**General Salamanca—I did not say things were worse. What I said was that in successive days they were**

aged to reduce the proportions of the war much more than they have done recently, and you all know the cause.

**TRYING TO STOP DISCUSSION.**

The President called the Deputy's attention to the fact that he was entering into the whole question and not sticking to his proposition, which was merely to ask the production of the documents, so as to give the government the opportunity of "explaining" there and then, he would do so, and then he would resume. This was a call for the President, who saw it was no trying to interrupt the pertinacious opposition General. He told him he might go on.

General Salamanca proceeded to say that at first the authorities found the traders and proprietors disposed to make the greatest sacrifices. At the slightest indication abundant supplies were forthcoming. The troops were well paid, well clothed and well fed. But still grave dangers were ahead. These were the excessive propensities of "certain elements" (he alluded to the Havana volunteers, who, guided by an excess of patriotism, utilized, perhaps, by occult influences, to the interests of "certain persons" (allusion, doubtless, to the *Salustiano* Calvo, Manzanillo, Lopez, &c.) of the slavery-sustaining government, contracting cliques of the Havana Casino, imposed themselves on the authorities and procured some all remembered (an allusion to the student murders), and acted against "a certain general" (alluding to Dulce) in the war all remembered, and forced "other generals" to acts which, although they might have been necessary for the moment, lowered their prestige as authorities. The result was what it could not fail to be. Some were drawn much beyond where they had wished to go.